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Resumo: Este trabalho investiga a existência de possíveis assimetrias nos objetivos do 
Banco Central. Assumindo que a função perda é assimétrica em relação a desvios 
positivos e negativos do gap do produto e da taxa de inflação em relação à meta, nós 
estimamos uma função de reação não-linear que permite identificar e testar a 
significância estatística dos parâmetros de assimetrias nas preferências da autoridade 
monetária. Para o período de 2000-2007, os resultados indicaram que o Banco Central 
brasileiro apresentou uma preferência assimétrica a favor de uma inflação acima da 
meta. Visto que este comportamento pode ser decorrente das decisões de política em 
momentos de fortes crises (tais como as de 2001 e 2002), nós delimitamos a nossa 
amostra para o período de 2004-2007. Para este período, nós não encontramos 
evidências empíricas apontando para qualquer tipo de assimetria nas preferências sobre 
a estabilização da inflação e do gap do produto. 
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Abstract: This paper investigates the existence of possible asymmetries in the Central 
Bank of Brazil’s objectives. By assuming that the loss function is asymmetric with 
regard to positive and negative deviations of the output gap and of the inflation rate 
from its target, we estimated a nonlinear reaction function which allows identifying and 
checking the statistical significance of asymmetric parameters in the monetary 
authority’s preferences. For years 2000 to 2007, results indicate that the Central Bank of 
Brazil showed asymmetric preference over an above-target inflation rate. Given that this 
behavior may stem from policy decisions in periods of severe crises (e.g., in 2001 and 
in 2002), we restricted our sample to the 2004-2007 period. We did not find any 
empirical evidence of any type of asymmetry in the preferences over the stabilization of 
inflation and of the output gap for this period. 
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Ever since the early 1990s the economic literature dealing with the analysis of 
monetary policy actions by way of reaction function estimates has been gaining 
momentum. Taylor (1993) rule is probably the most widely known specification of this 
reaction function in this literature. According to this rule, the monetary authority 
responds to deviations of output and of inflation from their targets through nominal 
interest rate fluctuations regarded as policy instrument. Another specification that has 
received considerable attention is the forward-looking reaction function proposed by 
Clarida et al. (1997, 2000). In this type of policy rule, the policymaker adjusts the 
current interest rate by considering the future values expected for inflation and for the 
output gap. A common feature of these two types of interest rate rules is that they are 
linear functions relative to variables that describe economic conditions. This can be 
explained by the fact that both specifications are theoretically based upon the linear-
quadratic model, where the monetary authority’s loss function is assumed to be 
quadratic and the equations describing the economic framework are linear. 
Nevertheless, two theoretical approaches were developed recently which have 
challenged the linear-quadratic framework behind the linear reaction function. The first 
approach rejects the assumption that the economic framework is linear. Orphanides and 
Wieland (1999) derive optimal policy rules for the case in which the monetary authority 
presents a quadratic loss function and is faced up with a zone-linear Phillips curve that 
allows for nonlinearities in the short-term trade-off between inflation and output. Nobay 
and Peel (2000) assessed optimal discretionary monetary policy under a nonlinear 
Phillips curve and found that the monetary authority can no longer remove the inflation 
bias by establishing a target for the output that equals the natural rate. Dolado et al. 
(2005) demonstrate that the central bank’s optimal reaction function for an economy 
with a nonlinear Phillips curve is a forward-looking interest rate rule that has been 
increased in order to include the interaction between expected inflation and the output 
gap.  
  The second theoretical approach considers that policymakers may have 
asymmetric preferences with regard to their objectives. According to Cukierman (2000), 
politicians and the general public are often more averse to negative output gaps than to 
positive ones in relation to the potential output. The Federal Reserve’s vice-chairman, 
Alan Blinder, asserted that “in most situations the CB will take far more political heat 
when it tightens preemptively to avoid higher inflation than when it eases preemptively 
to avoid higher unemployment” Blinder (1998, pp. 19-20). Given that in democratic 
governments independent central banks are not totally insensitive to political 
organizations, this type of asymmetry may be seen in the policymaker’s loss function. 
In addition, in periods during which the monetary authority is more concerned with 
lending credibility to its disinflationary policy, the loss due to positive deviations of the 
inflation rate from its target is likely larger than that one resulting from negative 
deviations of the same magnitude. 
The consequences of including asymmetric preferences in the monetary 
authority’s loss function have been investigated by several authors. Cukierman (2000) 
demonstrates that when the policymaker is uncertain about the economic conditions and 
when he is more sensitive to negative output gaps, an inflation bias arises even when the 
target for the actual output is the potential output of the economy. This result has been 
supported by empirical evidence gathered by Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) for a group 
of 22 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. 
Gerlach (2000) and Surico (2007) found out that the Federal Reserve was more worried 
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(2002) verified that the business cycle phase, measured by the output gap, has played an 
important role in the conduct of monetary policy by the central banks of Germany, USA 
and France. Cukierman and Muscatelli (2003) provide evidence of nonlinearities 
regarding inflation and output gap in reaction functions estimated for Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the USA. Dolado et al. (2003) observed that Federal Reserve’s 
preferences regarding inflation were asymmetric during the Volcker-Greespan era.  
Following this line of research, the present paper seeks to estimate a nonlinear 
reaction function for the Central Bank of Brazil that allows testing the existence of 
asymmetries in their objectives regarding inflation and output during the inflation 
targeting regime. Taking the model proposed by Surico (2007) as our theoretical basis, 
we obtain an optimal monetary policy rule for the monetary authority considering that 
its loss function is potentially asymmetric. Given that the presence of asymmetries in 
objectives produces nonlinear responses of the interest rate to inflation and to the output 
gap, we checked whether the policymaker’s preferences are symmetric by testing the 
null hypothesis of linearity of the reaction function. Also, we estimated the asymmetric 
parameters in the Central Bank’s preferences and tested whether these coefficients are 
statistically significant. 
The Brazilian literature on the Central Bank’s reaction function is not very 
extensive. Silva and Portugal (2001) estimated a Taylor rule for the periods that 
preceded and followed the inflation targeting regime and concluded that the experience 
acquired from the inflation targeting regime can be regarded as a case of credibility 
construction instead of an enhancement of Central Bank’s conservatism. Salgado et al. 
(2005) modeled the Central Bank’s reaction function using a threshold autoregressive 
(TAR) model and found different dynamics for the Selic interest rate during and outside 
the periods of exchange rate crises. Minella et al. (2003), Holland (2005), Soares and 
Barbosa (2006) showed that in the inflation targeting regime the Selic interest rate 
strongly reacted to expected inflation. Bueno (2005) estimated a Markov-switching 
reaction function and observed that the response of the Selic interest rate to inflation has 
been smaller than 1 or negligible for the different monetary policy regimes encountered. 
Neto and Portugal (2007)  estimated the reaction functions for the chairmanships of 
Armínio Fraga and Henrique Meirelles and found evidence supporting the conduct of 
monetary policy in the inflation targeting regime. Even though a small number of these 
studies consider nonlinearities in the reaction function, none of them seeks to confirm 
whether the Central Bank’s preferences regarding inflation and output have been 
asymmetric.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical model and 
derives the optimal reaction function for the interest rate as a first-order condition for 
the Central Bank’s optimization problem. Section 3 presents the reduced form for the 
interest rate rule to be estimated in order to check the existence of asymmetries in the 
monetary authority's objectives. Section 4 shows and analyzes the results. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The theoretical model 
 
The present paper is theoretically based upon the model proposed by Surico 
(2007). The model uses the new-Keynesian structure assessed by Clarida et al. (1999) 
and allows the monetary authority to have asymmetric preferences with regard to its 
objectives or targets. Specifically, the monetary authority is allowed to be more averse 
to negative deviations of the actual output from the potential output and to positive 
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asymmetries constitutes the explanation for possible nonlinear responses of the 
monetary policy interest rate to inflation and output fluctuations.  
 
2.1. Structure of the economy 
 
  Following Clarida et al. (1999), we considered an economy whose evolutionary 
behavior can be described by the following equations: 
 
 
11 () tt t t t t t x iE E x e ϕ π ++ =− − + +   (1)
 
1 tt t t kx E ut π θπ + =+ +   (2)
 
where xt is the output gap (the difference between actual output and potential output), πt 
is the inflation rate, Etxt+1 and Etπt+1 are the expected values for the output gap and for 
inflation conditional on the information available at t, it is the nominal interest rate, et is 
a demand shock, ut is a cost shock and ϕ, k and θ are positive constants.
1  
  The IS curve, represented by equation (1), is a log-linearized version of 
consumption Euler equation which is derived from the optimal family decision about 
consumption/saving, after the imposition of the market clearing condition. The expected 
future output gap shown in this equation indicates that, since families prefer to cut down 
consumption over time, the expectation for a higher level of consumption in the future 
leads to higher consumption in the present, thus increasing the current demand for 
output. 
  Phillips curve (2) captures the characteristic of staggered nominal prices in 
which each firm has a probability θ of keeping the price of its product fixed in any time 
period (Calvo, 1983). Given that probability θ is supposedly constant and independent 
of the time elapsed since the last adjustment, the average time at which the price is kept 
fixed is given by 1/1-θ. This discrete nature of price adjustment encourages each firm to 
set a higher price the higher the expected future inflation. The positive effect of the 
output gap on inflation reflects the increase in marginal costs produced by excess 
demand.  
 Finally,  shocks  et and ut comply with the following autoregressive processes: 
 
 
1 te t eet ê ρ − = +   (3)
 
1 tu t uut û ρ − = +   (4)
 
where 0 ≤ ρe, ρu ≤ 1 and, êt and ût are i.i.d random variables with zero mean and 
standard deviations σe and σu, respectively.  
 
2.2. Monetary authority’s asymmetric objectives 
 
  Suppose that monetary policy decisions are made before shocks et and ut. 
Therefore, conditional on the information available at the end of the previous period, the 
monetary authority tries to choose current interest rate it and a sequence of future 
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1 The aggregate behavioral equations (1) and (2) are explicitly derived from the optimizing behavior of 
firms and families in an economy with currency and nominal price rigidity (Clarida et al., 1999).   
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subject to equations (1) and (2), where δ is the fixed discount factor. The monetary 
authority’s loss function at time t, Lt, is given by: 
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* is the inflation target, λ is the relative weight on the deviation of the output 
gap from the potential output and μ is the relative weight on the stabilization of the 
interest rate. The monetary authority is assumed to stabilize inflation around the 
constant inflation target, π
*, to maintain the output gap closed at zero and to stabilize the 
nominal interest rate around its target, i
*. 
  The linex specification in (6) was introduced by Varian (1974) and included in 
the analysis of optimal monetary policy by Nobay and Peel (1998). The advantage of 
this function is that it allows the policymaker to deal differently with positive and 
negative output deviations from the potential output and deviations of the inflation rate 
from the inflation target. As shown in Figure 1, a negative value of γ indicates that the 
marginal loss associated with a negative output gap is larger than that of a positive 
output gap with the same absolute value. This occurs because whenever the output gap 
is positive, the exponential component in loss function (6) dominates the linear 
component, whereas the opposite is observed whenever the output gap is negative. In 
this case, the monetary authority is said to have a precautionary demand for economic 
expansion (Cukierman, 2000, 2004).   
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Figure 1 – Symmetric and asymmetric loss function relative to output gap 
 (a) and inflation (b) 
 
 
  A positive value of α reveals that the monetary authority has a precautionary 
demand for price stability, i.e., the marginal loss of a positive deviation of the inflation 
rate from its target is larger than that of a negative deviation of the same magnitude (see 
Figure 1). Although this behavior is plausible, one should underscore that linex 
specification (6) does not prevent α from being negative, indicating that a below-target 
inflation rate is costlier than an above-target one. For the special case in which both γ 
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Optimization problem (5) is solved under discretion. This implies that the 
policymaker regards the expectations of future variables as given and chooses the 
current interest rate, reoptimizing it in each period. Since there is no endogenous 
persistence in inflation and in output gap, the intertemporal optimization problem can be 
reduced to a static optimization problem sequence. Therefore, by taking the first-order 
condition and solving it for it, we obtain: 
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According to (7), the optimal nominal interest rate at time t reacts nonlinearly to 
inflation and to the output gap expected for time t. As c1 and c2 are both positive, the 
monetary authority increases the nominal interest rate in response to hikes both in the 
expected output gap and in the expected inflation rate.  
When both γ and α tend towards zero, by using the L’Hôpital’s rule, it is 
possible to show that equation (7) is reduced to the following reaction function: 
 
  **
11 21 () tt t t t iic E xc Eπ π −− =+ + − .  (9)
In this case, the monetary policy interest rate responds linearly to the expected output 
gap and to the inflation rate expected for period t.
2 From the comparison between 
equations (9) and (7), we can observe that the presence of asymmetries in the objectives 
of the monetary authority directly implies a nonlinear interest rate reaction function. 
Thus, a way to check the hypothesis of symmetric preferences is to test the functional 
form of the monetary authority’s reaction function.  
 
3. Reduced-form reaction function  
 
In this section, we derive the reduced form for the interest rate rule to be 
estimated so as to check the existence of asymmetries in the Central Bank’s loss 
function during the inflation targeting regime. As pointed out by Surico (2007), the 
estimation procedures of the model and of the test of the null hypothesis of symmetric 
preferences (H0:γ=α=0) are complex due to the indeterminacy of important parameters 
and due to the presence of unidentified nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis. 
For instance, if γ=α=0, then the coefficients related to the inflation rate and to the output 
gap in reaction function (7) are indeterminate. In addition, when α=0, the inflation 
target is an unidentified nuisance parameter, implying that the conventional statistical 
theory is not available for obtaining the asymptotic distribution of statistical tests under 
the null hypothesis (Luukkonen et al., 1988; van Dijk et al., 2002).  
To circumvent these problems, we followed the suggestion given by Luukkonen 
et al. (1988) and linearized the exponential terms in (7) by way of a first-order Taylor 
                                                 
 
2 This type of implicit interest rate rule was analyzed by Rudebusch (2002) and Clarida et al. (2000).  
  6expansion around γ=0 and α=0. The result of this procedure is the following reduced-
form reaction function: 
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(10)
where  t ζ  is the remainder of  the Taylor series approximation.  
  In order to get to the final specification of the reaction function to be estimated 
in this paper, we considered two changes to equation (10). First, we introduced two 
interest rate lags to capture the tendency of the monetary authority towards smoothing 
the changes in the monetary policy instrument and towards avoiding serial 
autocorrelation problems.
3 Among the possible explanations to this smoothing, we 
highlight the following: i) uncertainties over the data and over the coefficients in the 
monetary transmission mechanism; ii) the policymakers’ actions are taken only when 
they are confident about the results to be produced by these actions; iii) large changes in 
interest rates can destabilize the financial and exchange rate markets; iv) reversions in 
monetary policy actions may be seen as errors or evidence of policy inconsistency; v) 
small but persistent changes in the short-term interest rate cause a remarkable effect of 
the monetary policy on aggregate demand without requiring excess volatility of this 
interest rate.
4   
  The second change consists in replacing the expected inflation and output gap 
values in (10) with their realized values. This way, we obtain the following interest rate 
reaction function: 
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where the coefficients di, i=0,...,4, are given by  
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From expression (13), we may observe that the term in curly brackets is a linear 
combination of forecast errors and, for that reason, υt is orthogonal to any variable of 
the model available in the information set at t-1.  
  Two important characteristics of reaction function (11) should be underscored. 
The first concerns the fact that the hypothesis of symmetry in the monetary authority’s 
objectives can be tested by estimating coefficients di’s. From (11) and (12), one can see 
that the imposition of restriction γ=α=0 corresponds to d3 =d4=0. Thus, testing the null 
hypothesis of symmetric preferences, H0:γ=α=0, is the same as testing the null 
hypothesis of linearity, H
’
0=d3= d 4=0.
5 The statistical significance of the restrictions 
imposed by H
’
0 can be verified by the Wald test. Under H
’
0, the Wald test statistic has 
                                                 
 
3 For Brazil, interest rate smoothing by the Central Bank was observed by Silva and Portugal (2001), 
Minella et al. (2003), Salgado et al. (2005), Bueno (2005) and Neto and Portugal (2007). 
4 For a theoretical and empirical study of monetary policy interest rate smoothing, see Clarida et al. 
(1997), Sack (1998), Woodford (1999), Sack and Wieland (2000), Srour (2001) and Castelnuovo (2004).  
5 The power of the test which is based on reaction function (11) depends on the confirmation that d1 and 
d2 are statistically different from zero because it is possible not to reject the null hypothesis of linearity 
since these coefficients are equal to zero.    
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2 distribution with r degrees of freedom, where r is the number of 
restrictions imposed. The second characteristic is that the reduced form of the monetary 
policy rule allows obtaining estimates for the asymmetric parameters in the loss 
function, since α=2d3/d1 and γ=2d4/d2.  
  In addition to reaction function (11), we estimated five alternative specifications 
in order to render the empirical model more suitable to the conduct of the Brazilian 
monetary policy in the current inflation targeting regime. First, we considered a 
deviation from the original assumption that the inflation target is constant. This 
modification is necessary since in the 1999-2004 period, the inflation targets, 
established by the National Monetary Council (NMC), changed annually.
6 Therefore, 
the specification with a time-varying inflation target is given by:  
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  In the second alternative specification, we considered that the Central Bank 
reacts to deviations of the expected inflation from the inflation target. By knowing that 
the inflation targets for year T and T+1 in the Brazilian inflation targeting regime are 
disclosed to the policymaker at the beginning of year T, it is plausible to assume that 
monetary policy actions are taken based on the deviation of expected inflation from the 
target for the current and subsequent years. Thus, we followed the suggestion given by 
Minella et al. (2003) and we used the variable Dj, which is a weighted measure of the 
deviation of the expected inflation for years T and T+1 from their respective inflation 







jT T jT T t Dj
jj
EE ππ π π ++
−





where j is the monthly rate, EjπT is the inflation expectation in month j for year T, EjπT+1 
is the inflation expectation in month j for year T +1, π
*
T  is the inflation target for year T 
and π
*
T+1  is the inflation target for year T +1. The nonlinear reaction function with the 
variable Dj is denoted by: 
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  Finally, we considered nonlinear reaction functions in which the interest rate 
reacts to the output gap at t-2 and to the deviation of inflation from its target at t-1. This 
assumption is justified by the fact that the monthly data on inflation and economic 
activity are only available to the monetary authority with a lag of 1 and 2 periods, 
respectively. Therefore, we estimated the following specifications:  
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6 Table A1 in the Appendix shows the inflation targets for the 1999-2008 period.  
  84. Results 
4.1 Data description 
 
  To estimate the Central Bank’s nonlinear reaction functions described in the 
previous section, we used monthly data for the period between January 2000 and 
October 2007. The series were obtained from the Institute for Applied Economic 
Research (IPEA) and from the Central Bank of Brazil websites.
7 The dependent 
variable, it, is the annualized monthly Selic interest rate. This variable has been used as 
the major monetary policy instrument in the inflation targeting regime. 
  The inflation rate, πt, is the inflation accumulated in the past 12 months, 
measured by the Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
8 For the specification that 
includes the deviation of inflation from a constant target, we used the mean annual 
inflation targets.
 9 Where inflation targets were time-varying, we interpolated the annual 
targets in order to obtain the series with monthly frequency. 
The variable Djt present in specifications (16) and (19) is built from inflation 
targets established for years T and T+1, and from the series of inflation expectations 
obtained from the survey conducted by the Central Bank at financial institutions and 
consultancy firms. In this survey, firms are supposed to state the inflation rate they 
expect for years T (EjπT) and T+1 (EjπT+1). 
  The output gap (xt) is measured by the percentage difference between the 
seasonally adjusted industrial production index (yt) and the potential output (ypt), i.e.,           
xt = 100(yt -  ypt)/ypt. Here, there is an important problem due to the fact that the 
potential output is an unobserved variable and, for that reason, should be estimated. 
Thus, we obtained the proxy variable for the potential output in three different ways: 
using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, using a linear trend (LT) and using a quadratic 
trend (QT). The output gap series constructed from different potential output estimates 
are called x1t (HP), x2t (LT) and x3t (QT). Finally, we added the dummy variable Di,t (=1 
for 2002:10-2003:02 and 0, otherwise) in all specifications of the reaction function so as 
to capture the quick and strong increase in the Selic rate that resulted from the rise in 
inflation and in inflation expectations at the end of 2002 and at the beginning of 2003. 
Before estimating the reaction function, we ran ADF tests to check the 
stationarity of the model’s variables. We chose the optimal number of lagged difference 
terms to be included in each regression, k, based on the Schwarz information criterion. 
The maximum autoregressive order was equal to 24. For the squares of the three output 
gap series, the tests included a constant (c), whereas a linear trend (t) was also included 
for the Selic rate. 
Table 1 shows that the ADF tests reject, at a 10% significance level, the null 







                                                 
 
7 The graphs for the series used are shown in the Appendix. 
8 The IPCA is calculated by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and is the price 
index used by the NMC as benchmark for the inflation targeting regime. 
9 In all years, except for 2003, we used the central inflation targets as determined by the NMC. In 2003, 
the target used was the one adjusted by the Central Bank (8.5%). 
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* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%.  
                             
 
4.2 Estimated reaction functions 
 
  First, we estimated reaction functions (11), (14) and (16) using the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) with the optimal weighting matrix which takes into 
account possible heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the residuals (Hansen, 
1982). In practice, we used the method proposed by Newey and West (1987) with three 
lags in order to estimate the variance and covariance matrix. The set of instrumental 
variables includes six lags for the Selic rate, output gap and inflation rate, lags (-1) and 
(-3) for the squared output gap, a constant term and the dummy variable Di,t. These 
instruments imply 14 overidentifying restrictions. We tested the validity of these 
restrictions by way of Hansen’s (1982) J test. 
  The estimation results are shown in Table 2. Specifications (A), (B) and (C) 
refer, respectively, to specifications with a constant inflation target, with the variable 
inflation rate and with deviation of the expected inflation from the inflation target. On 
the other hand, specifications HP, LT and QT are related to the use of three different 
output gap series (x1t, x2t e x3t) as explained in section 4.1.  
  Right away, we may note that the estimates for parameter d3, which measures 
the response of the Selic rate to the squared deviation of current inflation (or of the 






Estimates of nonlinear reaction functions (11), (14) and (16): 2000:1-2007:10 
Specifications  
(A)  (B)   (C) 
 
Parameters 
HP LT QT    HP LT QT    HP LT QT 
0 d    15.25
*
  (0.47) 
 15.45
*
  (0.42) 
 15.01
*
  (0.55) 
   14.67
*
  (0.59) 
 15.28
*
  (0.44) 
 14.49
*
  (0.58) 
   14.03
*
  (0.27) 
 13.85
*
  (0.45) 
 13.95
*
  (0.28) 
1 d    1.980
*
  (0.36) 
 1.763
*
  (0.35) 
 1.985
*
  (0.38) 
   2.301
*
  (0.53) 
 1.841
*
  (0.42) 
 2.366
*
  (0.55) 
   4.244
*
  (0.29) 
 4.509
*
  (0.49) 
 4.300
*
  (0.32) 
2 d   -0.094
n.s
  (0.29) 
-0.401
**
  (0.17) 
 0.108
n.s
  (0.35) 
 -0.036
n.s
  (0.42) 
-0.293
n.s
  (0.21) 
-0.041
n.s
  (0.40) 
 -0.214
n.s
  (0.16) 
 0.017
n.s
  (0.13) 
-0.186
n.s
  (0.15) 
3 d   -0.240
*
  (0.06) 
-0.251
*
  (0.06) 
-0.252
*
  (0.06) 
 -0.271
*
  (0.08) 
-0.188
*
  (0.05) 
-0.270
*
  (0.08) 
 -0.551
*
  (0.05) 
-0.588
*
  (0.08) 
-0.555
*
  (0.05) 
4 d    0.109
n.s
  (0.09) 
 0.069
n.s
  (0.05) 
 0.180
n.s
  (0.11) 
   0.125
n.s
  (0.10) 
-0.048
n.s
  (0.08) 
 0.128
n.s
  (0.09) 
 -0.000
n.s
  (0.04) 
 0.033
n.s
  (0.03) 
 0.012
n.s
  (0.04) 
ρ1  1.483
*
  (0.04) 
 1.348
*
  (0.06) 
 1.503
*
  (0.04) 
   1.578
*
  (0.07) 
 1.654
*
  (0.06) 
 1.588
*
  (0.06) 
   1.286
*
  (0.08) 
 1.241
*
  (0.08) 
 1.265
*
  (0.09) 
ρ2 -0.573
*
  (0.04) 
-0.460
*
  (0.05) 
-0.579
*
  (0.04) 
 -0.689
*
  (0.05) 
-0.774
*
  (0.05) 
-0.694
*
  (0.05) 
 -0.453
*
  (0.06) 
-0.429
*
  (0.06) 
-0.438
*
  (0.06) 
dummy   24.90
*
  (7.03) 
 8.544
**
  (6.24) 
 26.40
*
  (7.54) 
   21.80
*
  (6.66) 
 17.31
*
  (5.93) 
 20.54
*
  (5.85) 
   8.117
*
  (2.31) 
 6.690
*
  (1.90) 
 7.665
*
  (2.29) 
R
2 – adjusted   0.978   0.968   0.982     0.968   0.977   0.973     0.990   0.988   0.990 
W(2) - prob    0.000   0.001   0.000     0.002   0.000   0.001     0.000   0.000   0.000 
J(14) - prob   0.844   0.873   0.814     0.736   0.648   0.742     0.809   0.850   0.836 
         Note: 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 







in all of the estimated reaction functions. It should be highlighted that a negative 
coefficient over 
*
tt π π −  indicates that a reduction in the Selic rate in response to a 
decrease in inflation relative to the target of a given size is larger than the increase of 
this interest rate caused by an increase in the deviation of inflation with the same 
magnitude. This behavior is consistent with a Central Bank that has an asymmetric 
preference that favors an above-target inflation rate.  
  Due to the nonlinear framework, the responses of the monetary policy 
instrument to deviations of the current inflation and of the expected inflation from the 
























where  E(·) indicates the sample mean. Using these expressions and the coefficient 
values shown in Table 2, we estimated that the response of the Selic rate to the 
deviation of inflation from its target was on average equal to 1.52 in specifications A 
and B, and 3.86 in specification C. This indicates that nonlinear interest rate rules 
satisfy Taylor’s (1993) principle. In addition, the stronger reaction of the monetary 
policy to the expected inflation concurs with the results obtained by Holland (2005) and 
Soares and Barbosa (2006) and underscores the forward-looking nature of Central 
Bank’s decisions.  
  In general, the reaction of the interest rate at the output gap level, measured by 
parameter d2, was nonsignificant. The coefficient over the squared output gap, d4, was 
not statistically different from zero in any of the estimated models. This means that 
there is no empirical evidence of a nonlinear response of the monetary policy instrument 
to the output gap.   
  The last two lines in Table 2 show the p-values (prob) for the joint hypothesis of 
symmetric preferences and for the hypothesis of validity of overidentifying restrictions. 
For all estimated specifications, the hypothesis of a linear reaction function is strongly 
rejected. This evidence clearly results from the nonlinear reaction of the monetary 
authority to the deviations of inflation from the target. The results of the J test indicate 
that the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected at a significance level of 10%. 
  Table 3 shows the estimates for the monetary authority’s parameters of 
asymmetric preference. The coefficients were found using expressions α=2d3/d1 and 
γ=2d4/d2. The standard errors were calculated using the delta method. Consistently with 
the results shown in Table 2, we can observe that the coefficients that measure the 
asymmetry in the preferences over the output gap, γ, were not statistically different from 
zero. Conversely, the values for the asymmetric parameter regarding the preference over 
inflation,  α, had a negative sign and were statistically significant in all estimated 
specifications. This indicates that the negative deviations of inflation from the target of 
a given size cause a greater loss for the Brazilian monetary authority than the positive 











Estimates for asymmetric preferences  
Parameters specifications 
(A)   
  HP LT QT 
α -0.243
*
  (0.02) 
-0.284
*
  (0.04) 
-0.254
*
  (0.03) 
γ -2.307
n.s
  (7.83) 
-0.346
n.s
  (0.25) 
 3.328
n.s
  (10.3) 
(B)   
  HP LT QT 
α -0.235
*
  (0.03) 
-0.204
*
  (0.03) 
-0.228
*
  (0.02) 
γ -7.036
n.s
  (84.9) 
 0.327
n.s
  (0.68) 
-6.162
n.s
  (59.9) 
(C) 
 
  HP LT QT 
α -0.260
*
  (0.03) 
-0.261
*
  (0.02) 
-0.258
*
  (0.03) 
γ   0.002
n.s
  (0.40) 
 3.958
n.s
  (30.5) 
-0.132
n.s
  (0.44) 
                 Note: 
* Significant at 1%. 
n.s Nonsignificant.  
 
 
  In Table 4, we provide the estimates for reaction functions (17)-(19), in which 
the monetary policy instrument depends on the deviation of inflation from the target at 
time t-1 and of the output gap at time t-2. Initially, we estimated the monetary policy 
rules using ordinary least squares. As the ARCH test revealed remarkable problems 
with autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, we estimated the reaction functions 
assuming that the conditional variance of error terms follows an ARMA(p,q) process, 
where p is the order of the ARCH terms and q is the order of the GARCH terms. The 
last line in Table 4 shows the orders p and q of the GARCH models estimated by 
maximum likelihood.
10  
  In general, the results are similar to those shown in Tables 2 and 3. The main 
difference concerns the positive and statistically significant response of the Selic rate to 
the output gap, measured by coefficient d2. This suggests that the measure of the 
economic activity entering the reaction function is the gap of the period known by the 
Central Bank at the time when monetary policy decisions are made. With regard to the 
Brazilian monetary authority’s loss function, Table 4 shows that the asymmetric 
parameter in the preferences over the output gap, γ, is not statistically different from 
zero, whereas the coefficient that measures the asymmetry in the preferences over the 
deviations of inflation from the target, α, is negative and significant in eight out of nine 
specifications. 
  In brief, the set of empirical results shown above provides evidence that the 
Central Bank of Brazil has been more averse a to below-target inflation than to an 
above-target one. This behavior is the opposite of the one expected by a monetary 
authority  that is  more concerned with lending credibility to its disinflationary policy. A  
                                                 
 
10 The selection of p and q was based on Akaike and Schwarz information criteria.   Table 4 
Estimates of nonlinear reaction functions (17)-(19): 2000:1-2007:10 
Specifications  
(A)  (B)   (C) 
 
Parameters 
HP LT QT    HP LT QT    HP LT QT 
0 d    15.17
*
  (0.26) 
 15.37
*
  (0.23) 
 14.89
*
  (0.36) 
   15.24
*
  (0.60) 
 14.79
*
  (0.91) 
 14.95
*
  (0.62) 
   14.47
*
  (0.52) 
 13.85
*
  (0.76) 
 14.34
*
  (0.50) 
1 d    1.397
*
  (0.15) 
 1.493
*
  (0.16) 
 1.313
*
  (0.18) 
   0.932
*
  (0.33) 
 1.571
*
  (0.44) 
 0.934
*
  (0.32) 
   4.286
*
  (0.84) 
 6.170
*
  (1.23) 
 4.042
*
  (0.74) 
2 d    0.441
**
  (0.18) 
 0.353
**
  (0.18) 
 0.431
**
  (0.19) 
   1.081
*
  (0.34) 
 0.758
***
  (0.41) 
 0.975
*
  (0.29) 
   1.070
*
  (0.41) 
 1.049
**
  (0.45) 
 0.938
*
  (0.30) 
3 d   -0.096
*
  (0.03) 
-0.098
*
  (0.03) 
-0.099
*
  (0.04) 
 -0.077
n.s
  (0.05) 
-0.142
**
  (0.07) 
-0.064
n.s
  (0.05) 
 -0.721
*
  (0.20) 
-0.933
*
  (0.24) 
-0.657
*
  (0.17) 
4 d    0.075
n.s
  (0.05) 
 0.030
n.s
  (0.04) 
 0.110
**
  (0.05) 
   0.104
n.s
  (0.09) 
 0.011
n.s
  (0.10) 
 0.080
n.s
  (0.07) 
 -0.041
n.s
  (0.11) 
-0.092
n.s
  (0.08) 
-0.006
n.s
  (0.08) 
ρ1  1.603
*
  (0.03) 
 1.657
*
  (0.04) 
 1.658
*
  (0.04) 
   1.733
*
  (0.05) 
 1.750
*
  (0.06) 
 1.708
*
  (0.05) 
   1.593
*
  (0.07) 
 1.560
*
  (0.07) 
 1.585
*
  (0.07) 
ρ2 -0.666
*
  (0.03) 
-0.728
*
  (0.04) 
-0.714
*
  (0.04) 
 -0.779
*
  (0.05) 
-0.788
*
  (0.06) 
-0.759
*
  (0.05) 
 -0.641
*
  (0.06) 
-0.603
*
  (0.07) 
-0.637
*
  (0.06) 
dummy   18.87
*
  (3.92) 
 16.15
*
  (3.73) 
 20.66
*
  (4.54) 
   22.14
*
  (4.54) 
 28.63
**
  (12.81) 
 20.88
*
  (8.05) 
   25.29
*
  (6.41) 
 27.51
*
  (7.49) 
 24.22
*
  (5.63) 
α -0.138
*
  (0.04) 
-0.131
*
  (0.03) 
-0.151
*
  (0.05) 
 -0.166
***
  (0.09) 
-0.180
*
  (0.07) 
-0.136
n.s
  (0.08) 
 -0.336
*
  (0.07) 
-0.302
*
  (0.06) 
-0.325
*
  (0.06) 
γ   0.338
n.s
  (0.26) 
 0.172
n.s
  (0.27) 
 0.510
n.s
  (0.36) 
   0.192
n.s
  (0.17) 
 0.028
n.s
  (0.25) 
 0.164
n.s
  (0.16) 
 -0.077
n.s
  (0.20) 
-0.176
n.s
  (0.15) 
-0.013
n.s
  (0.18) 
R
2 – adjusted   0.991   0.991   0.991     0.991   0.991   0.991     0.993   0.993   0.993 
W(2) - prob    0.001   0.001   0.002     0.084   0.113   0.134     0.008   0.001   0.002 
LB(4) -prob   0.501   0.636   0.282     0.321   0.396   0.345     0.133   0.171   0.115 
ARCH(4)  -prob   0.680   0.779   0.811     0.770   0.703   0.850     0.643   0.399   0.590 
JB - prob   0.913   0.875   0.948     0.577   0.474   0.568     0.958   0.633   0.949 
GARCH(p,q)     2.1     2.1    2.1       1.1     1.1     1.1       1.1     1.1      1.1 
    Notes: 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%. 
n.s Nonsignificant. LB(4) refers to the Ljung-Box statistic for serial autocorrelation of up to the fourth 
order. ARCH(4) refers to the LM-ARCH statistic for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of up to the fourth order. JB refers to the Jarque-Bera statistic. possible explanation to this is that the concavity of the reaction function with regard to 
deviations of the inflation rate from the target may reflect the monetary policy decisions 
made in periods of supply shocks (such as the energy crisis in 2001) and of fiscal 
dominance (last quarter of 2002).
11 On any of these occasions, the Central Bank might 
have adopted a more gradualist behavior toward inflation control than that which is 
expected from a policymaker with asymmetric preference over a below-target inflation. 
Also, the Brazilian experience with inflation the below-central target is recent and 
relatively short. For instance, when one considered the inflation deviation series 
compared to a variable target, only 30 of 94 observations showed values smaller than 
zero. On the other hand, for inflation deviation series with a fixed target, πt-π
*, and 
deviation of the expected inflation from the target, Djt, the number of observations with 
negative values drops to 19. 
  Based on this, we decided to estimate nonlinear reaction functions for the period 
between January 2004 and October 2007. The advantages of using this period are the 
greater stability of the economic activity, lower predominance of shocks affecting 
inflation expectations and a larger balance between the number of observations in which 
inflation was above and below target.  
 
Table 5 
Estimates of nonlinear reaction functions (17) and (19): 2004:1-2007:10 
Specifications  
(A)  (C) 
 
Parameters 
HP LT QT    HP LT QT 
0 d    13.47
*
  (1.34) 
 14.80
*
  (0.96) 
 13.40
*
  (1.13) 
   10.08
***
  (5.11) 
 9.950
n.s
  (6.44) 
 10.86
*
  (3.79) 
1 d    1.534
*
  (0.39) 
 1.868
*
  (0.32) 
 1.403
*
  (0.39) 
   5.108
**
  (2.28) 
 8.277
*
  (2.90) 
 4.568
*
  (2.03) 
2 d    0.945
n.s
  (0.78) 
 0.374
n.s
  (0.33) 
 0.753
n.s
  (0.64) 
   1.603
n.s
  (1.41) 
 1.336
n.s
  (1.05) 
 1.097
n.s
  (0.89) 
3 d    0.250
n.s
  (0.26) 
 0.081
n.s
  (0.19) 
 0.211
n.s
  (0.22) 
   2.463
n.s
  (5.38) 
 1.851
n.s
  (5.56) 
 1.632
n.s
  (3.99) 
4 d    0.149
n.s
  (0.25) 
-0.101
n.s
  (0.14) 
 0.154
n.s
  (0.18) 
   0.282
n.s
  (0.44) 
 0.077
n.s
  (0.30) 
 0.264
n.s
  (0.30) 
ρ1  1.600
*
  (0.06) 
 1.607
*
  (0.06) 
 1.574
*
  (0.06) 
   1.461
*
  (0.08) 
 1.434
*
  (0.09) 
 1.440
*
  (0.08) 
ρ2 -0.641
*
  (0.06) 
-0.663
*
  (0.06) 
-0.621
*
  (0.06) 
 -0.486
*
  (0.08) 
-0.459
*
  (0.09) 
-0.471
*
  (0.08) 
α   0.326
n.s
  (0.38) 
 0.087
n.s
  (0.20) 
 0.301
n.s
  (0.36) 
   0.964
n.s
  (2.34) 
 0.447
n.s
  (1.32) 
 0.715
n.s
  (1.93) 
γ   0.316
n.s
  (0.65) 
-0.538
n.s
  (0.83) 
 0.410
n.s
  (0.70) 
   0.352
n.s
  (0.62) 
 0.115
n.s
  (0.42) 
 0.482
n.s
  (0.72) 
R
2 – adjusted   0.997   0.997   0.997     0.997   0.997   0.997 
W(2) - prob    0.519   0.579   0.396     0.788   0.948   0.683 
LB(4) -prob   0.246   0.297    0.233     0.255   0.143   0.280 
ARCH(4)  -prob   0.627   0.235   0.674     0.524   0.348   0.512 
JB - prob   0.095   0.240   0.091     0.084   0.104   0.123 
Notes: 
* Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 10%. 
n.s Nonsignificant. LB(4) refers to 
the Ljung-Box statistic for serial autocorrelation of up to the fourth order. ARCH(4) refers to the 
LM-ARCH statistic for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of up to the fourth order. JB 
refers to the Jarque-Bera statistic. 
  
                                                 
 
11 Blanchard (2004) provides empirical evidence of fiscal dominance in Brazil in 2002.  
  15  Table 5 shows the estimates for the parameters of reaction functions (17) and 
(19), and for the coefficients of asymmetric preferences of the Central Bank.
12,  13 In 
general, we observe that only the target estimated for the Selic rate, d0, the coefficient of 
response to the deviation of inflation from the target, d1, and the autoregressive 
coefficients,  ρ1 and ρ2, were statistically significant. In addition, we did not find 
evidence that the Brazilian monetary authority has asymmetric preference over output 
above or below the target. Finally, we noted that the coefficient that measures the 
asymmetric preference over the stabilization of inflation, α, had a positive but not 
significant sign. This finding suggests that Central Bank’s asymmetric preferences over 
an above-target inflation may be associated with monetary policy actions taken in 




  In this paper, we assessed possible asymmetries in the Central Bank’s objectives 
by estimating nonlinear reaction functions for the interest rate. To achieve that, we 
derived an optimal monetary policy rule taking into account an asymmetric loss 
function regarding positive and negative deviations of the output gap and of the 
inflation rate from the inflation target. Since the presence of asymmetries produces 
nonlinear responses of the interest rate to the deviations of the expected inflation from 
its target and from the output gap, we checked whether preferences are symmetric by 
testing the null hypothesis of linearity of the reaction function. Also, we found the 
policymaker’s coefficients of asymmetric preferences by estimating the reaction 
function in its reduced form and verified whether they are significantly different from 
zero.  
  The empirical results showed that the Central Bank’s monetary policy decisions 
for the 2000-2007 period may be characterized by a nonlinear reaction function relative 
to inflation, but linear relative to the output gap. Quite specifically, we found evidence 
that the Brazilian monetary authority has been more averse to negative rather than 
positive deviations of inflation from its target. As this behavior may result from policy 
decisions in periods of strong crises (as in 2001 and 2002), we estimated the coefficients 
of asymmetric preferences for the 2004-2007 period. The results for this reduced sample 
did not indicate the existence of any type of asymmetric preference regarding the 




BEC, F. et al. Asymmetries in monetary policy reaction function: evidence for the U.S., 
French and German Central Banks. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and 
Econometrics, v. 6, n. 2, 2002. 
BLANCHARD, O. Fiscal Dominance and Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Brazil. 
Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. (Working Paper, 10389). 
                                                 
 
12 Initially, we tried to estimate specifications (11), (14) and (16) using GMM in the reduced sample. 
However, we often had convergence problems or estimates for parameters that run counter to those 
predicted theoretically. Possible reasons for this may be the small sample size, the misspecification of the 
nonlinear model or the presence of weak instruments. Given these shortcomings, we decided to estimate 
only the reaction functions that include the deviation of inflation from the target at t-1 and of the output 
gap at t-2.  
13 We omitted the results for specification B because estimations revealed major inaccuracy in the 
estimates of coefficients d1 through d4.  
  16BLINDER, A. Central Banking in Theory and Practice. Massachusetts; The MIT 
Press, 1998. 
BUENO, R. de L. da S. The Taylor Rule under Inquiry: Hidden states. XXVII Encontro 
Brasileiro de Econometria. Anais. Natal, 2005. 
CALVO, G. Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, v. 12, n. 3, 1983. 
CLARIDA, R. et al. Monetary policy rules in practice: some international evidence. 
Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997. (Working Paper, 6254). 
________________. The science of monetary policy: a new Keynesian perspective. 
Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999. (Working Paper, 7147). 
________________. Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: evidence and 
some theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 115, n. 1, 2000. 
CUKIERMAN, A. The inflation bias result revisited. Tel-Aviv University, 2000. 
Mimeo.  
CUKIERMAN, A.; GERLACH, S. The inflation bias revisited: theory and some 
international evidence. The Manchester School, v. 71, n. 5, 2003. 
CUKIERMAN, A.; MUSCATELLI, A. Do Central Banks have precautionary 
demands for expansions and for price stability? Theory and evidence. Tel-Aviv 
University, 2003. Mimeo.  
DOLADO, J. J et al. Nonlinear monetary policy rules: some new evidence for the 
US.  Université de Montreal: Département de sciences économiques, 2003. (Cahier, 24-
2003).  
DOLADO, J. J. et al. Are monetary-policy reaction functions asymmetric? The role of 
nonlinearity in the Phillips curve. European Economic Review, v. 49, n. 2, 2005.   
GERLACH, S. Asymmetric policy reactions and inflation. Bank for International 
Settlements. 2000. Mimeo. 
HANSEN, L. P. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. 
Econometrica, v. 50, n. º 4, 1982. 
HOLLAND, M. Monetary and exchange rate policy in Brazil after inflation targeting. 
XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia. Anais. Natal, 2005. 
LUUKKONEN, R. P. et al. Testing linearity against smooth transition autoregressive 
models. Biometrika, v. 75, n. 3, 1988. 
MINELLA, A. et al. Inflation targeting in Brazil: constructing credibility under 
exchange rate volatility. Brasília: Banco Central do Brasil, 2003. (Trabalhos para 
Discussão, 77). 
NETO, P. C. F. de B.; PORTUGAL, M. S. Determinants of Monetary Policy 
Committee Decisions: Fraga vs.  Meirelles.   Porto Alegre: PPGE/UFRGS, 2007. 
(Texto para Discussão, 11). 
NEWEY, W. K.; WEST, K. D. A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix. Econometrica, v. 55, nº 3, 1987.   
NOBAY, A. R.; PEEL, D. A. Optimal monetary policy in a model of asymmetric 
Central Bank preferences. London School of Economics, 1998. Mimeo. 
_________________________. Optimal monetary policy with a nonlinear Phillips 
curve. Economics Letters, v. 67, n. 2, 2000. 
ORPHANIDES, A.; WIELAND, V. Inflation zone targeting. European Economic 
Review, v. 44, n. 7, 1999. 
RUDEBUSCH, G.D.  Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary 
policy inertia. Journal of Monetary Economics, v. 49, n. 6, 2002. 
  17SACK, B. Does the Fed act gradually? A VAR analysis.  Washington, DC: Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1998. (Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series, 17). 
SACK, B.; WIELAND, V. Interest-rate smoothing and optimal monetary policy: a 
review of recent empirical evidence. Journal of Economics and Business, v. 52, n. 1-
2, 2000.  
SALGADO, M. J. S. et al. Monetary policy during Brazil’s Real Plan: estimating the 
central bank’s reaction function, Revista Brasileira de Economia, v. 59, n. 1, 2005.  
SILVA, M. E. A. da; PORTUGAL, M. S. Inflation targeting in Brazil: an empirical 
evaluation. Porto Alegre: PPGE/UFRGS, 2001 (Texto para Discussão, 10). 
SOARES, J. J. S.; BARBOSA, F. de H. Regra de Taylor no Brasil: 1999-2005. XXXIV 
Encontro Nacional de Economia. Anais. Salvador, 2006. 
SROUR, G. Why do Central Banks smooth interest rates? Ottawa: Bank of Canada, 
2001. (Working Paper, 17). 
SURICO, P. The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. inflation: The case of asymmetric 
preferences. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, v. 31, nº 1, 2007.  
TAYLOR, J. B. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, v. 39, 1993. 
van DIJK, D. et al. Smooth transition autoregressive models: a survey of recent 
development. Econometric Reviews, v. 21, n. 1, 2002.  
VARIAN, H. A Bayesian approach to real estate assessment. In: FEINBERG, S.E.;  
WOODFORD, M. Optimal monetary policy inertia. Cambridge: National Bureau of 














Inflation target: 1999-2008 






1999 8.0%  ±2.0%  - 
2000 6.0%  ±2.0%  - 
2001 4.0%  ±2.0%  - 
2002 3.5%  ±2.0%  - 
2003 4.0%  ±2.5%  8.5% 
2004 5.5%  ±2.5%  5.5% 
2005 4.5%  ±2.5%  5.1% 
2006 4.5%  ±2.0%  - 
2007 4.5%  ±2.0%  - 
2008 4.5%  ±2.0%  - 
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 Figure A5 – Deviation of the expected inflation from the target 
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